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Abstract—By adding users as a new dimension to connectivity,
on-body Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices have gained consider-
able momentum in recent years, while raising serious privacy and
safety issues. Existing approaches to authenticate these devices
limit themselves to dedicated sensors or specified user motions,
undermining their widespread acceptance. This paper overcomes
these limitations with a general authentication solution by in-
tegrating wireless physical layer (PHY) signatures with upper-
layer protocols. The key enabling techniques are constructing
representative radio propagation profiles from received signals,
and developing an adversarial multi-player neural network to
accurately recognize underlying radio propagation patterns and
facilitate on-body device authentication. Once hearing a suspi-
cious transmission, our system triggers a PHY-based challenge-
response protocol to defend in depth against active attacks. We
prove that at equilibrium, our adversarial model can extract all
information about propagation patterns and eliminate any irrel-
evant information caused by motion variances and environment
changes. We build a prototype of our system using Universal
Software Radio Peripheral (USRP) devices and conduct extensive
experiments with various static and dynamic body motions in
typical indoor and outdoor environments. The experimental
results show that our system achieves an average authentication
accuracy of 91.6%, with a high area under the receiver operating
characteristic curve (AUROC) of 0.96 and a better generalization
performance compared with the conventional non-adversarial
approach.
Index Terms—IoT devices, on-body authentication, adversarial
learning.
I. Introduction
Human-centric Internet of Things (IoT) has recently gained
increasing popularity in both industrial and academic fields
by adding users as a new dimension to connectivity and
enabling intriguing user-centered applications, such as remote
healthcare and real-time activity tracking [2], [3]. The mini-
malist design paradigm of IoT devices appears to be two sides
of the same coin: it allows ultra-low-power communications
while rendering communication links vulnerable to malevolent
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Fig. 1. On- and off-body radio propagations. On-body signals are dominated
by creeping waves, while off-body signals are mainly comprised of LOS and
multi-path components.
attackers. Since on-body IoT devices are generally attached to
users’ bodies to continuously record fine-grained vital signs,
security breaches of these devices pose a serious threat to
users’ everyday privacy [4], [5] and safety [6], [7].
Despite growing attempts and extensive endeavors, it is still
challenging to thwart invaders for hardware-constrained on-
body IoT devices [8]–[10]. Recent efforts have demonstrated
the feasibility of exploiting radio characteristics in body area
networks (BANs) to facilitate device verification [11], [12].
Moreover, dedicated sensors, such as accelerometers [13] and
gyroscopes [14], have been leveraged to authenticate wearable
devices. However, hardly any of them have obtained prevalent
adoption. They either require the assistance of specialized user
motions [11], [12], or are confined to fitness-related wearables
[13], [14]. To embrace the coming wave of human-centric IoT,
it is critical for a device authentication solution to support
various on-body IoT devices without specified user motions
in diverse environments.
The salient physical layer (PHY) signatures naturally under-
lying different BANs present us with an exciting opportunity.
As depicted in Fig. 1, for off-body wireless links, where a
transmitter (Tx) and a receiver (Rx) are placed on different
human bodies, radio signals are mainly comprised of direct
line-of-sight (LOS) and multi-path components. On the other
hand, for on-body links, where a Tx-Rx pair is carried on
the same body, radio signals are governed by creeping waves
[15]–[18]. The distinct radio propagation patterns potentially
enable a general security solution relying on prevalent wireless
chips. However, radio signals in BANs are severely affected by
IoT users’ body motions and surrounding environments. As a
consequence, on- and off-body signals can exhibit significantly
different patterns under a specific user motion in a specific am-
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2bient environment, and their patterns tend to vary dramatically
under a different motion in a new environment. Furthermore,
the frequent change of users’ motion and location in daily life
makes it a highly challenging task to manually select features
to represent propagation patterns from real-world radio traces.
To address this challenge, we propose a motion and en-
vironment invariant authentication framework for on-body
IoT devices by exploiting distinct BAN radio propagation
signatures. The basic ideas lying in the proposed system
are effectively constructing representative radio propagation
profiles from received signals, and leveraging a neural network
to essentially recognize propagation patterns and thus verify
on-body IoT devices anytime and anywhere.
We realize the above ideas by answering the following two
questions.
1) How to obtain effective information on radio propagation
patterns from received signals? The received radio signals
from real-world environments typically comprise massive
noisy components due to complex environmental dynamics
and unwanted radio interference, which makes it unlikely to
recognize radio propagation patterns directly from such noisy
signals. Therefore, it is crucial to extract fine-grained radio
features from raw signals. In our experiments, we observe that
distinctive radio propagation signatures can be represented in
the time and frequency domains of received signal strength
(RSS) segments. Based on this observation, we construct
effective radio propagation profiles that contain representative
time and frequency domain features from RSS segments for
subsequent propagation pattern recognition.
2) How to learn a neural network that generalizes well
in unseen scenarios? Radio features extracted from RSS seg-
ments generally convey substantial information that is specific
to ongoing user motions and surrounding environments. As a
result, a neural network that is trained under a specific motion
in a specific environment will undoubtedly not work well
when being applied to verify devices under another motion
in a different environment. To overcome this predicament,
we develop an adversarial multi-player network for robust
device authentication. Particularly, our network includes four
functional components: a Feature Extractor, an On-Off Predic-
tor, a Domain Discriminator and an Environment Classifier.
To learn transferable features, we implement an adversarial
training criterion, where the predictor works together with
the extractor to learn radio propagation patterns, and both the
discriminator and classifier, meanwhile, force the extractor to
selectively eliminate motion and environment specific features
from itself. After this training process, the extractor and
predictor are expected to be resilient to unseen user motions
and environments.
Summary of results. We implement a working prototype of
our authentication system with three Universal Software Radio
Peripheral (USRP) devices and conduct extensive experiments
under frequently appearing body motions in multiple indoor
and outdoor environments. The experimental results show that
our system achieves an accuracy of 91.6%, with an area under
the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC) of 0.96.
Specifically, it can successfully recognize 90.6% of legitimate
devices and at the same time mitigate 92.8% of active attacks.
Contributions. The main contributions of this work are
summarized as follows.
• We propose a general authentication system that secures
various on-body IoT devices without specified user mo-
tions in diverse environments. The crux of the proposed
system is to construct reliable radio propagation profiles
from RSS segments and to develop an adversarial multi-
player neural network for essentially identifying on-body
IoT devices.
• We theoretically analyze our adversarial network and
prove that at equilibrium, the learned feature representa-
tion contains all information about BAN radio propaga-
tion patterns, and becomes invariant to motion variances
and environment changes.
• We build a prototype of our system on USRP devices and
conduct extensive experiments with various frequently
appearing body motions in a variety of indoor and outdoor
environments. The experimental results demonstrate the
effectiveness and generalizability of our system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The
literature review is provided in Section II. In Section III,
we illustrate the distinct radio signatures in different BAN
channels. In Section IV, we sketch the main design of our
device authentication system and its integration with upper-
layer protocols. Next, Section V details the construction of
radio propagation profiles. Then, Section VI elaborates on our
adversarial multi-player network for verifying on-body IoT
devices. Section VII shows the evaluation results. Finally, the
paper is concluded in Section VIII.
II. Related Work
Device/user authentication. Spurred by the prevalence
of wearable devices, user/device authentication has already
drawn significant interest in the academic community [19].
Dedicated sensors, including accelerometers [13], biometric
[20] and acoustic sensors [21], are widely used to infer
identities of wearable devices. Moreover, motion sensors [22]
are also leveraged to check if wearable devices share unique
movement patterns when device carriers are in the walking
state. However, sensor-based approaches limit themselves to
fitness-related wearables or to sports scenarios. In contrast, our
system takes advantage of pervasive wireless chips embedded
in IoT devices and enables device verification under static and
dynamic user body motions.
Besides assistance from auxiliary sensors, underlying PHY
signatures in BANs are also examined for verifying wear-
able devices. There have been many studies on the channel
measurements of BANs [15], [16], [23], [24], which reveal
essential differences between on- and off-body radio prop-
agations. RSS variances are calculated to identify wearable
devices in healthcare applications [11]. Furthermore, creeping
waves are also exploited in [25] to secure on-body devices,
wherein small- and large-scale RSS variations are extracted to
indicate on- or off-body radio propagations. Compared with
the prior work, our system presents two main differences.
First, along with time domain radio features, frequency domain
features are abstracted to give a comprehensive description
3of on- and off-body radio propagations. Second, our work
develops a customized adversarial network to essentially ex-
tract underlying propagation patterns and obtains a better
generalization performance under various user motions in
diverse environments.
Wireless sensing with machine learning. Despite other
applications with radio frequency (RF) signals [26], [27],
machine learning approaches have been widely applied in
wireless sensing tasks. In [28], unsupervised learning ap-
proaches are used to facilitate signal classification in spectrum
sensing. A support vector machine is exploited to classify
human motions based on RF characteristics [29]. In [30], a
deep learning based user authentication scheme is proposed by
using Wi-Fi signals, which capture unique human physiologi-
cal and behavioral characteristics that are inherited from daily
activities. Furthermore, relying on wireless signals, 2D and 3D
human poses are estimated through walls and occlusions with
the usage of cross-modal networks in [31], [32], respectively.
In this work, we extract PHY signatures existing in radio
signals and input them into a neural network to determine
whether the signals are transmitted from on-body wireless
devices.
Adversarial learning. Our system adopts an adversarial
neural network for wireless device authentication. The adver-
sarial network is originally proposed to estimate the density of
an unknown distribution of digital images in [33]. Thereafter,
it is applied to promote the generalization performance of
deep neural networks for predictive tasks. A semi-supervised
model [34] is trained through a domain adversarial training
for image classification. Moreover, an adversarial multi-task
model [35] is developed for robust speech recognition. In [36],
a conditional adversarial model is introduced for sleep stage
prediction. In this work, a customized adversarial network is
developed to eliminate irrelevant information on user motions
and surrounding environments, and ultimately to boost the
performance of on-body IoT device authentication.
III. Exploiting PHY Signatures in BAN Channels
A. Threat Model
On-body devices, which are colocated with the wearable
device on the same body, are considered to be legitimate.
In contrast, attackers are off-body devices, which are not
carried by the same user. They may locate at another user
or somewhere else to actively broadcast malicious messages.
We do not consider attacks from on-body devices, because it is
normal for a user to check the ownership of an IoT device be-
fore wearing it. Moreover, we do not take into account passive
attacks, i.e., eavesdropping attacks. In addition, attackers may
be equipped with advanced hardware and have been aware of
the transmission technology and deployed security mechanism.
In this situation, they can forge the MAC addresses of valid
devices and inject fake data into the network.
B. Theoretical Explanation of Distinct On- and Off-Body
Radio Propagations
Since the human body is basically a low-loss dielectric
at microwaves frequencies, including Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
frequency bands, radio propagations between two on-body
devices are significantly influenced by the user’s body. Previ-
ous measurements [15], [16] have demonstrated that creeping
waves, which are diffracted by human tissues and spread out
along the human body, play a predominant role in on-body
electromagnetic wave propagations. According to creeping
wave theory [23], the electric field over the conducting surface
for the vertical polarization on the elliptical path can be
expressed as
E = 2
√
η
2pi
√
PT xGT x
d
e− jkdL (a, b, φ, ϕ) , (1)
where d is the distance between Tx and Rx antennas, η the
vacuum wave impedance, PT x the transmission power, GT x
the gain of the Tx antenna, and k the wave number in the
free space. Moreover, L(·) represents the attenuation factor that
indicates the loss on the surface, and it is a function of a and
b, i.e., the semi-major and semi-minor axises of the ellipse
respectively, φ the exit point angle at Tx, and ϕ the trapping
point angle at Rx. Furthermore, compared with the vertically
polarized component, the horizontal component suffers more
attenuation. Thus, the orientations of on-body antennas also
have a great impact on the path loss of creeping waves.
Eq. 1 suggests that the body surface and the positions and
orientations of Tx and Rx antennas, rather than environmental
dynamics, dominate the attenuation of on-body propagations.
Specifically, when two transceivers are both deployed on the
same human body, any body movement can change the body
surface as well as antenna positions, which consequently cause
variations in the Tx-Rx distance d and the attenuation factor
L(·). As a result, on-body signals would be stable in a static
motion status, and they will fluctuate dramatically when the
body moves.
On the contrary, radio waves between a pair of devices
that are not placed on the same body typically propagate
in a different manner. Off-body signals are usually reflected
by surrounding floor, walls and furniture (small-scale fading)
and disturbed by Tx-Rx distance changes [37] (large-scale
fading). Compared with on-body signals, off-body signals are
mainly comprised of LOS and multi-path components, and are
less sensitive to the changes of the body surface and antenna
positions. Therefore, we see that distinct propagation patterns
exist between on- and off-body radio waves.
C. Feasibility Study
Based on the above analysis, we conduct a motivational
experiment to demonstrate the feasibility of exploiting radio
propagation features to verify on-body IoT devices. In the
experiment, two USRP devices are carried by a volunteer
to work as a pair of on-body Tx and Rx. The left device
is placed on another volunteer, acting as an off-body Tx.
We collect on- and off-body signals in three different sce-
narios, i.e., standing and walking in an indoor environment,
respectively, and standing in an outdoor environment. Fig. 2
depicts the RSS and cumulative distribution function (CDF)
of the collected signals. We observe that compared with off-
body signals, on-body signals are more stable when the user
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Fig. 2. RSS and CDF of on- and off-body radio signals in different scenarios.
stands still, while having a lager RSS variance in the walking
status. This observation testifies that on-body propagations
are highly sensitive to user body motions. Moreover, off-
body signals always fall into the high frequency range with a
higher probability in comparison with on-body signals in each
scenario, which verifies that off-body propagations are more
susceptible to environmental dynamics.
The above experimental observations verify that differen-
tiable radio propagation patterns exist between on- and off-
body channels in each scenario. This supports our premise
that we can rely upon PHY signatures to authenticate various
on-body IoT devices.
IV. Adversarial Network Based Device Authentication
A. Design Rationale
It is, however, non-trivial to reliably capture propagation
patterns from real-world radio traces. As shown in Fig. 2,
although on- and off-body signals show distinguishable prop-
agation patterns in each scenario, their patterns are remarkably
different between the three scenarios. Consequently, an authen-
tication model that is trained under a specific user motion in
a specific environment will typically not generalize well in
different scenarios.
To deal with such dilemma, we resort to adversarial neural
networks, which have recently surfaced as a popular tool to
discover transferable features in the deep learning field and
have proven their advantages in many real-world applications
[34]–[36]. Being a branch of deep learning approaches, ad-
versarial networks facilitate automatic extraction of complex
and latent feature representations by adopting a hierarchical
structure [38]. More importantly, different from traditional ap-
proaches that learn transferable features, such as autoencoders
[39], adversarial networks have the ability to eliminate irrel-
evant features in learned representations with an adversarial
training criterion. Specifically, in the application of on-body
authentication, user body motions and surrounding environ-
ments can easily incur different levels of variances and dynam-
ics in RSS measurements. Once these noisy measurements are
fed into a model for training, motion and environment specific
features will be learned, which consequently hampers its
authentication performance at the testing phase. Therefore, we
reap the benefits of adversarial networks to exclude irrelevant
features induced by motions and environments and further
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recognize underlying on- and off-body propagation patterns
in real-world scenarios. Towards this end, we propose an
adversarial network based authentication system to seamlessly
authenticate various on-body IoT devices.
B. Design Overview
Our system takes advantage of an adversarial network to
extract distinct radio propagation patterns for on-body de-
vice authentication. Fig. 3 illustrates the framework of our
authentication system. It takes as input RSS time series and
outputs the corresponding device authentication results. It is
worth noting that to verify RSS measurements of various low-
end embedded IoT devices, our authentication system runs on
gateway devices, such as smartphones, which have sufficient
capability to perform low-latency and accurate learning based
inferences [40].
The core of our authentication system includes two compo-
nents – Propagation Profile Characterization and Propagation
Pattern Recognition.
1) Propagation profile characterization. First, this com-
ponent divides the RSS time series into multiple ba-
sic segments. Then, representative time and frequency
domain features are extracted for fine-grained charac-
terization of potential propagation patterns. Finally, the
extracted features are integrated into radio propagation
profiles for future pattern recognition by the adversarial
network.
2) Propagation pattern recognition. Upon receiving a
propagation profile, the adversarial network first utilizes
a functional block to abstract a feature representation in
terms of on- and off-body propagations. Subsequently,
the network infers the identity of a connected IoT
device through an on-off prediction block. Moreover, an
adversarial block is added to eliminate motion and en-
vironment specific features in the feature representation
in the training phase. All blocks are learned through an
adversarial training process to promote the emergence
of features that are resilient to motion variances and
environment changes.
C. Integration with Upper-Layer Security Protocols
Based on PHY signatures, our authentication system can
integrate with existing security protocols in the upper layers
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to shield human-centric IoT networks from active attackers.
Integrating our system with the 802.11 protocol, the final
cross-layer protocol not only follows similar reasoning with
upper-layer security standards but also takes the propagation
patterns in PHY into consideration. Specifically, we shed light
on how our system can be exploited to secure IoT device
pairing and data transmission against authenticated spoofing
attacks and authentication deadlock attacks, respectively.
Authenticated spoofing mitigation. In many cases, users’
authenticated login credentials and MAC addresses are suscep-
tible to malicious attackers. Once deciphering this confidential
information, an attacker can associate with a gateway device
by masquerading a legitimate device and thereafter launch a
variety of spoofing attacks on the IoT system. For instance, it
can either inject fake messages into the system or steal users’
personalized profiles from it.
Our system can mitigate these types of attacks by consoli-
dating upper-layer security protocols with PHY propagation
verification in the device association process as described
in Fig. 4. Specifically, when hearing an association request
message from a surrounding device, the gateway device sends
back an acknowledgment frame (ACK) to request propagation
pattern verification. In response to the ACK, the surrounding
device must transmit a series of empty packets to the gateway
device. Subsequently, the gateway device decides whether the
transmitter is carried by the same user based on our authen-
tication system. If the propagation pattern is recognized to be
on-body, the gateway device regards it as an authorized IoT
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device and starts subsequent communication links. Otherwise,
the gateway device deems it as a malicious attacker and denies
the association request.
Authentication deadlock mitigation. Authentication dead-
lock attack is one of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. In
802.11 protocols, a legitimate IoT device must be authen-
ticated and associated with a gateway device before data
transmission process. During data transmission between the
IoT device and gateway device, an attacker injects an Open
System Authentication Request frame to the gateway device
in the name of the IoT device. This attack will consequently
lead to an authentication deadlock, causing the gateway device
to delete the authenticated association with the IoT device
and thus cannot transmit or receive any frames for the victim
device for a few minutes [41].
Our security protocol defends against authentication dead-
lock attacks with slight changes in existing upper-layer pro-
tocols as shown in Fig. 5.Upon receiving an authentication
request during data transmission, the gateway device detects
that the received request nominally comes from an device that
is actually in the authenticated state, and thus it can consider
this authentication frame as suspicious [42]–[44]. Then, the
gateway device will not delete the authenticated association
immediately but allow the IoT device to send a challenge
frame denying that the request is from itself. After that, the
gateway device sends an ACK frame to the requesting node
to start a propagation verification for incoming empty signals.
If the propagation pattern mismatches the on-body one, the
gateway device decides to drop the authentication request and
continues with the previous data transmission.
V. Propagation Profile Characterization
A. Signal Segmentation
Our system first partitions RSS measurements into multiple
segments. As an RSS segment is a basic unit for device
authentication, the segment interval needs to be carefully
determined. If the interval is too long, on- and off-body signals
will be probably both included in the same segment. If it is
too short, the system will be unable to recognize any segment.
We empirically find that a time interval of 5s is capable of
correctly differentiating over 90% of on- and off-body IoT
devices.
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Fig. 7. Examples of time domain features.
B. Time Domain Feature Extraction
Since on- and off-body signals have different levels of im-
pact from body motions, large- and small-scale fading, we first
decompose each RSS segment into multi-scale variations by
using filters. As creeping waves are sensitive to body motions
and their frequencies fall into relatively low frequency bands
with a high probability [45], a band-pass filter is leveraged to
extract motion-induced variations. Based on our experimental
observations, most fluctuations caused by body motions fall
between 0.5 Hz and 15 Hz. Variations in the residual low and
high frequency bands are also extracted by a low-pass filter
and a high-pass filter, respectively, as large- and small-scale
variations.
With multi-scale variations, we select six time domain fea-
tures, including maximum, minimum, median, variance, kurto-
sis and skewness, to characterize propagation signatures from
each kind of variations. The maximum, minimum, median and
variance are chosen to describe the impact from the human
body, because dramatic body vibration typically contributes to
rapid changes in the maximum, minimum and median and also
results in a large variance. Kurtosis and skewness show the
symmetry and asymmetry of radio signals, respectively, and
can potentially capture propagation patterns due to the fact
that both symmetric and asymmetric components are richly
shared in radio waves. For finer-grained feature extraction, we
divide each kind of variations into ten chunks and extract six
features from each chunk. Therefore, a total of 180 feature
points are extracted to describe radio propagation signatures
from the time domain of an RSS segment. Fig. 7 presents some
time domain features extracted from motion-induced variations
when an user stands still in a normal office setting. We can
observe that these features are significantly different between
on- and off-body signals, which encourages us to exploit
these time domain features to characterize distinct BAN radio
propagations.
C. Frequency Domain Feature Extraction
Different power distributions on the frequency band between
on- and off-body signals have been clearly presented in Fig. 2.
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Thus, besides time domain features, frequency domain features
are also extracted to capture distinct signatures of different
BAN radio propagations.
To abstract frequency domain features, we start by perform-
ing a Short-Time Fourier Transform (STFT) on each RSS
segment to obtain its two-dimensional spectrogram. Specifi-
cally, with a signal sampling rate of 500 Hz, we conduct a
1000-point Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) within a 2s sliding
window, shifting 1s each time to make full use of sampling
data. To summarize information in the frequency domain,
the frequency band of each spectrogram, i.e., [0,250] Hz,
is partitioned into 40 intervals, each of which is associated
with a frequency component of the segment. To effectively
indicate propagation signatures, we equally segment the low
frequency band, i.e., [0,15] Hz, into 30 intervals and the
residual high frequency band into 10 intervals, and we sum
up the magnitudes in each interval in every FFT result. In
this way, we transform a two-dimensional spectrogram into
a 4×40 matrix M. Then we take two frequency domain
features from M: the component magnitude (or each element
in M) and the proportion of each component (PC), such that
PC( j) =
∑4
i=1 M(i, j)∑40
j=1
∑4
i=1 M(i, j)
, where j = 1, · · · , 40. Finally, a total of
200 feature points are extracted from the frequency domain of
an RSS segment.
VI. Propagation Pattern Recognition
A. Adversarial Model
After the profile characterization, we consider the propaga-
tion pattern recognition as a binary classification task (X,Y),
where X ⊆ Rn is the sample space and Y = {0, 1} the target
label set. Specifically, each x ∈ X is a radio propagation
profile sample, and y ∈ Y indicates the corresponding on- or
off-body device. Moreover, for each x, z ∈ {1, 2, · · · , nz} and
v ∈ {1, 2, · · · , nv} denote a pair of auxiliary labels that refer to
the motion and environment, respectively, that x is sampled
from.
For effective classification, we develop an adversarial multi-
player neural network, as shown in Fig. 8. In particular, our
model consists of four components – a Feature Extractor E,
an On-Off Predictor P, a Motion Discriminator D and an
Environment Classifier C.
7Feature extractor E. We leverage a convolutional neural
network (CNN) to aggregate information over time and fre-
quency domain features to extract underlying radio propaga-
tion patterns. More specifically, eight 1D convolutional layers
are stacked in our feature extractor. At each layer of E, 128
convolutional kernels with the kernel size 1×3, stride 1 and
padding 0 are used to filter valuable ingredients from the pre-
vious layer’s output. In addition, we use a max-pooling (MP)
layer with the kernel size of 2 to reduce the representation size
and a rectified linear unit (ReLU) to introduce nonlinearity
into the model. Thus, at layer l, a latent representation rl are
computed as
rl = σMP+ReLU
(
fl ∗ rl−1
)
, (2)
where ∗ is the convolution operator, fl convolutional kernels
and rl−1 the output of layer l−1. At last, given an input sample
x, the corresponding feature representation can be obtained by
E(x) = CNN(x; Θe), (3)
where Θe denotes the extractor’s trainable parameters.
On-off predictor P. Based on a feature representation E(x),
we parameterize the on-off predictor as a fully-connected
neural network. In particular, two fully-connected layers with
Sigmoid and Softmax functions, respectively, are used to map
E(x) into a two-dimensional probability vector Py(·|E(x)) ∈ R2
in terms of on- and off-body devices, as follows
g = σS igmoid(wg · E(x) + bg), (4)
Py(·|E(x)) = σS o f tmax(wh · g + bh), (5)
where Θp = (wg,bg,wh,bh) is the predictor’s parameters. Once
the probability vector Py(·|E(x)) is obtained, we can have a
predicted target label yˆ for x, as follows
yˆ = arg max
y
Py(·|E(x)). (6)
Adversarial discriminator D and classifier C. Since
ongoing body motions and surrounding environments have
different impacts on radio signals, two adversaries D and C
are adopted to remove their respective features in the feature
representation E(x). Specifically, body motions typically cause
Tx-Rx distance changes or shadowing, resulting in large-scale
variations of radio signals, however surrounding environments
incur rich multipath propagations and small-scale variations.
Thus, the information corresponding to motions and environ-
ments in E(x) can be considered to be independent. Note that
the adversarial components will not increase the computational
complexity when our system performs on-body authentication,
because they are only needed in the training phase.
Since simply wiping out all dependencies between the
feature extractor and adversaries could degrade the perfor-
mance of target label prediction, our model adopts a con-
ditional adversarial architecture [36] for better generalization
performance. For this purpose, we concatenate the outputs
of feature extractor and on-off predictor as the input of
two adversaries. Hence, D and C predict body motions and
environments with outputs Dz
(
·∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) ∈ Rnz and
Cv
(
·∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) ∈ Rnv . In the proposed model, we also
parameterize the discriminator and classifier as two fully-
connected neural networks, which both have the same con-
figurations with the predictor. Moreover, the parameters of D
and C are denoted as Θd and Θc, respectively.
Adversarial training criterion. To obtain useful network
parameters, we train our adversarial model on a set of training
data, which obeys the distribution qtrain(x). For the predictor P,
the cross-entropy is used to calculate the discrepancy between
the prediction Py (·|E(x)) and the true posterior distribution
qy(·|x) over qtrain(x), as follows
LP(P, E) , Ex∼qtrain(x)Ey∼q(y|x)
[− log P (y|E(x))] . (7)
By minimizing LP, the parameters Θe and Θp can be updated.
Moreover, we define the loss of D as the cross-entropy be-
tween its output Dz
(
·∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) and the true conditional
distribution qz(·|x) over qtrain(x), which is expressed as
LD (D, E; P) , Ex∼qtrain(x)Ez∼q(z|x)
[
− log D
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x)))] .
(8)
Similarly, the loss of C is given by
LC (C, E; P) , Ex∼qtrain(x)Ev∼q(v|x)
[
− log C
(
v
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x)))] .
(9)
Note that to effectively train our multi-player model, the
concatenation branch of the predictor’s output is a one-way
link (i.e., the dashed blue arrow line in Fig. 8), along which
gradients of the adversarial components don’t propagate back.
Hence, the parameters Θe, Θd and Θc can be refined through
the optimization of LD and LC .
Now that we have defined all loss functions, we proceed
to implement an adversarial training criterion on our multi-
player model for robust device authentication under various
body motions in different environments. The key idea is that to
generalize well in unseen scenarios, a predictive model is able
to discriminate well between on- and off-body devices, but it
cannot distinguish scenarios associated with input samples. To
achieve this goal, we use a minimax game between E, P, D
and C in the training phase. Particularly, P, D and C aim to
minimize their own losses for good prediction performance.
However, E tries its best to maximize LD and LC to cheat
its adversaries D and C, respectively, and at the same time,
it cooperates with P to minimize LP. Through this minimax
game, the multi-player model can finally learn transferable
features that are resilient to body motions and environments.
According to the above objectives, we integrate all loss
functions into one value function, which is given as
V (E, P,D,C) ,LP − αLD − βLC , (10)
where α > 0 and β > 0 are hyperparameters. Based on the
value function (10), the adversarial training criterion can be
implemented by optimizing the following minimax problem:
min
E,P
max
D,C
V (E, P,D,C) . (11)
B. Theoretical Analysis of Adversarial Model
In this subsection, we prove that the output of the on-off
predictor becomes invariant to motion variances and environ-
mental dynamics through the minimax game. Specifically, we
8first present the optimal predictor and adversaries in Proposi-
tion 1 and Proposition 2, respectively, without proving them,
and refer the reader to [36] (Proposition 2) for details. Then,
we illustrate the virtual training criterion, optimal extractor
and optimal outputs, respectively, in Corollary 1, Proposition
3 and Corollary 2. Differing from the theoretical efforts in the
prior work [36], our analysis focuses on a practical adversarial
model.
Proposition 1 (Optimal predictor) For a fixed extractor E, the
output of the optimal predictor P∗ over qtrain(x) achieves
P∗ (y|E(x)) = q(y|E(x)), (12)
and the loss of P∗ is
LP∗ (E) , min
P
LP(P, E) = H(y|E(x)), (13)
where H(·|·) denotes the conditional entropy function.
Note that given E, the equality (12) indicates the maximal
predictive capability that a predictor P can learn from the
feature representation E(x) over qtrain(x).
Proposition 2 (Optimal discriminator and classifier) Given
any extractor E and any predictor P, the optimal discriminator
D∗ and classifier C∗ have their losses, respectively, as
LD∗ (E; P) , min
D
LD(D, E; P) = H
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) , (14)
LC∗ (E; P) , min
C
LC(C, E; P) = H
(
v
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) . (15)
With the optimal predictor, discriminator and classifier, we
proceed to simplify the minimax training criterion (11).
Corollary 1 (Virtual training criterion) If P, D and C have
enough capacity and are trained to be optimal over qtrain(x),
the minimax optimization (11) is equivalent to the minimiza-
tion of a virtual value function V(E), which is expressed as
V(E) ,H (y|E(x)) − αH
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x)))
− βH
(
v
∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))) . (16)
Proof: Considering the optimal predictor P∗ in Proposi-
tion 1, we can rewrite the losses of the optimal discriminator
D∗ and optimal classifier C∗ in Proposition 2, by substituting
(12) into (14) and (15), respectively, as
LD∗ (E) = H
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))) , (17)
LC∗ (E) = H
(
v
∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))) . (18)
According to the equalities (13), (17) and (18), the initial
value function (10) can be simplified as the virtual version
(16). Thus, optimizing the minimax optimization (11) equals
to minimizing V(E).
Based on the virtual training criterion, we can obtain the
optimal extractor by minimizing V(E).
Proposition 3 (Optimal extractor) If E, P, D and C have
enough capability and are trained to be optimal over qtrain(x),
any optimal extractor E∗ satisfies
H (y|E∗(x)) = H (y|x) , (19)
H
(
z
∣∣∣E∗(x), qy(·|E∗(x))) = H (z∣∣∣qy(·|E∗(x))) , (20)
H
(
v
∣∣∣E∗(x), qy(·|E∗(x))) = H (v∣∣∣qy(·|E∗(x))) . (21)
Proof: When E is fixed, LP∗ (E) = H (y|E(x)) ≥
H(y|x), LD∗ (E) = H
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))) ≤ H (z∣∣∣qy(·|E(x))) and
LC∗ (E) = H
(
v
∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))) ≤ H (v∣∣∣qy(·|E(x))). Therefore,
we obtain a lower bound of V(E), that is
V(E) ≥ H(y|x) − αH
(
z
∣∣∣qy(·|E(x))) − βH (v∣∣∣qy(·|E(x))) . (22)
Since the lower bound is achieved if and only if all conditions
(19), (20) and (21) hold, proving that any optimal extractor
E∗ satisfies these conditions is identical to proving
V(E∗) = H(y|x) − αH
(
z
∣∣∣qy(·|E∗(x))) − βH (v∣∣∣qy(·|E∗(x))) .
(23)
We note that the lower bound is achievable by considering a
special case, where E∗(x) = qy(·|x), an extractor with the best
representative ability over qtrain(x). In this case, we can check
that the equality (23) holds.
Remark 1 Proposition 3 indicates that when all players are
trained to be optimal and our adversarial model reaches equi-
librium, the extractor E is able to extract all information about
y from the training samples and eliminate any information
about z and v except what is also related to y.
Corollary 2 (Optimal outputs) If E, P, D and C have enough
capacity and are trained to be optimal over qtrain(x), the
outputs of our adversarial model achieve
Py(·|E(x)) = qy(·|x), (24)
Dz
(
·∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) = qz(·|qy(·|x)), (25)
Cv
(
·∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) = qv(·|qy(·|x)). (26)
Proof: Based on Proposition 1, P (y|E(x)) = q(y|E(x)).
According to Proposition 3, H (y|E(x)) = H (y|x), which
implies that q(y|E(x)) = q(y|x). Hence, P(y|E(x)) = q(y|x).
When both P and D are optimal, the equality (17) holds,
that is D
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) = q (z∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))). Accord-
ing to Proposition 3, the equality (20) holds, which is
equivalent to q
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), qy(·|E(x))) = q(z|qy(·|E(x))). Then,
by considering P(y|E(x)) = q(y|x), we achieve the equality
D
(
z
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) = q(z|qy(·|x)). Similarly, we can have
C
(
v
∣∣∣E(x), Py(·|E(x))) = q(v|qy(·|x)).
9Algorithm 1 Adversarial training for our multi-player neural
network.
Input: Labeled samples {(xi, yi, zi, vi)}Mi=1, learning rates(
ηe, ηp, ηd, ηc
)
, hyperparameters (α, β).
for the number of training iterations do
Sample a mini-batch of training data {(xi, yi, zi, vi)}mi=1
Update the predictor P:
LiP ← − log P (yi|E(xi))
Θp ← Θp − ηp∇Θp 1m
∑m
i=1LiP
for the number of inner loops do
ui ← Py (·|E(xi)) I stop backpropagation
oi = E(xi) ⊕ ui I concatenation
Update the discriminator D:
LiD ← − log D (zi|oi)
Θd ← Θd − ηd∇Θd 1m
∑m
i=1LiD
Update the discriminator C:
LiC ← − log C (vi|oi)
Θc ← Θc − ηc∇Θc 1m
∑m
i=1LiC
Update the extractor E:
Vi ← LiP − αLiD − βLiC
Θe ← Θe − ηe∇Θe 1m
∑m
i=1Vi
end for
end for
C. Adversarial Training Algorithm
Along the pipeline of theoretical analysis above, we design
an adversarial training algorithm for our multi-player model.
As depicted in Algorithm 1, it starts by updating the parame-
ters of P in each training iteration and then optimizes those of
D, C and E in the inner loop. Since it is quite challenging to
stabilize components in an adversarial model, especially the
one with a minimax loss to optimize [33], [46], we have E
in the inner loop for extra training to refine it. Furthermore,
the model could minimize the value function V by increasing
the losses LD and LC improperly, which is known as model
collapse phenomenon. To avoid this situation, we also update
D and C in the inner loop, which aims at leading LD and LC
to descend in right directions. Additionally, at the beginning of
each inner iteration, an intermediate variable ui is assigned to
be Py(·|E(xi)) and thereafter concatenated with E(xi) as input
oi for two adversaries. These operations can effectively detach
P from D and C, and thus prevents gradients from propagating
back to P as aforementioned.
In our experiment, we build our multi-player network and
implement the adversarial training algorithm using Python
with PyTorch packages. The training data consists of about
five thousand samples and is transformed with the z-score
normalization before training. We empirically set the mini-
batch size to 750, each hyperparameter to 0.5 and each
learning rate to 0.001. Finally, we update the parameters Θe,
Θd and Θc with more than five thousand iterations.
VII. Evaluation in Real Environments
A. Experimental Methodology
Implementation. We implement a proof-of-concept pro-
totype of the proposed system with three GNURadio/USRP
B210 devices. These devices are configured to communicate in
the 2.4 GHz ISM band with a sampling rate of 500 Hz, which
is feasible for most commercial wearable devices. Moreover,
two USRP devices are placed on a volunteer, referred to as a
legitimate user. Specifically, one of them locates at the left side
of the user’s waist as an on-body receiver, and the other device
is carried by the user’s right hand as an on-body transmitter.
The remaining USRP device is held by another volunteer,
referred to as a malicious user, and it is regarded as an off-
body transmitter.
Data collection. We collect radio traces under different
surrounding environments and user body motions. The ex-
perimental environments encompass three indoor settings, a
laboratory, an office and a corridor, and two outdoor ones,
a rooftop and a park. In each environment, the legitimate
user, carrying the on-body transceivers, is asked to perform
controlled and uncontrolled motions, respectively. In the con-
trolled scenario, the legitimate user is confined to take five ba-
sic motions, including two static actions, sitting and standing,
and three dynamic ones, arm moving, rotating and walking.
In the uncontrolled scenario, the legitimate user can impose
whatever body motions he or she likes. However, the malicious
user, holding the off-body transmitter, is not restricted to any
specified motion throughout the experiment and can walk
freely in the proximity of 1-5 meters away from the legitimate
user. When collecting data, we ask two users to take their
own motions for one minute, during which we control one of
the on- and off-body transmitters to broadcast signals and use
the receiver to record corresponding radio traces. The above
trial is repeated for 20 times in each motion setting, and the
participants are given a rest period of around 30s between two
consecutive trials. Finally, we conduct our experiment over
seven days with five volunteers, including two females and
three males, and yield radio traces of ten hours in total.
Dataset. We partition the collected on- and off-body traces
into RSS segments and extract propagation profiles from these
segments according to Section V. Then, we label the extracted
on- and off-body profiles with respect to corresponding mo-
tions and environments and obtain a total of 7200 labeled sam-
ples for our adversarial network. Therein, 6000 samples are
from the controlled user motion scenario, and 1200 samples
are from the uncontrolled scenario. When training and testing
our model, we randomly take out 4800 samples from the
controlled scenario for training and combine the leftover 1200
ones and all 1200 samples from the uncontrolled scenario for
testing. Moreover, the numbers of on- and off-body samples
are equal in both the training and testing sets.
Evaluation metrics. To demonstrate the performance of the
proposed system, we use accuracy, true positive (TP) rate and
false positive (FP) rate as metrics, which are given as below.
• Accuracy. Accuracy is defined as the ratio of the number
of correctly classified RSS segments to the total number
of on- and off-body segments.
• TP rate. TP rate denotes to the ratio of the number
of correctly detected on-body RSS segments to the total
number of on-body segments.
• FP rate. FP rate is computed as the ratio of the number
of mistakenly recognized off-body RSS segments to the
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Fig. 9. ROC curve of the proposed system. The corresponding AUROC is
0.96 and the reference line stands for the random guessing model.
total number of off-body segments.
B. Performance Results
TABLE I
Overall Performance Results
Accuracy TP Rate FP Rate
91.6% ± 2.4% 90.6% ± 1.9% 7.2% ± 2.8%
We train our model on the collected training dataset and run
the trained model on the testing dataset to obtain prediction
results of all testing samples. Specifically, the training dataset
only consists of samples from the five controlled motions in all
environments. Besides controlled samples, the testing dataset
contains samples from the uncontrolled scenarios, which are
never used to train our model.
Overall performance. We first illustrate the overall per-
formance of our authentication system. Specifically, based on
all prediction results and their environment and motion labels,
we can average accuracies, TP and FP rates in all motion-
environment scenarios and obtain the results in Table I. As
shown in Table I, our system is able to identify 91.6% of on-
and off-body devices on average. Specifically, it can correctly
recognize on-body devices with a ratio of 90.6% and success-
fully mitigate 92.8% of attack attempts from off-body devices.
Since on-body authentication is a binary classification task, we
further use the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve
to measure how well our system can correctly discriminate on-
and off-body samples from different scenarios. The ROC curve
depicts TP rates against FP rates at various threshold settings
and tells a classifier’s capability of distinguishing between
two classes. For a good classifier, high TP and low FP rates
are expected when the threshold is in (0, 1). As depicted in
Fig. 9, our system’s ROC curve first goes straight up and then
becomes steady promptly as the FP rate increases. Besides,
the area under the ROC curve (AUROC) reaches 0.96, which
is close to 1, i.e., the AUROC of the ideal classifier. The above
results indicate that our system achieves a good discrimination
ability for on- and off-body samples under different motions
and environments.
Performance under different motions. We then elaborate
on the system’s performance under each frequently appearing
motion. In general, each selected motion has a unique move-
ment pattern of the human body and thus exhibits a different
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Fig. 11. Performance in the controlled and uncontrolled motion scenarios.
effect on BAN radio waves. We divide all prediction results
into different motion groups based on the motion label and
calculate the evaluation metrics in each group. As plotted in
Fig. 10 (a), we observe that the proposed system achieves
better performance for the static motions than for the dynamic
ones. The same observations can be found in Fig. 10 (b).
Therein, higher TP and lower FP rates are clearly present
in the static states. It is due to that body motions have a
great impact on the attenuation of on-body propagations as
explained before, and there are fewer disturbances caused
by body movements in radio signals when the user sits or
stands still with IoT devices, which makes it much easier
for the proposed system to recognize on- and off-body prop-
agation patterns. Despite the above differences, the system
still achieves average TP and FP rates of 92.0% and 6.0%,
respectively, in the controlled user motion scenario.
Next, we compare the system performance in the uncon-
trolled user motion scenario with that in the controlled sce-
nario. As illustrated in Fig. 11, the system shows performance
degradation in terms of accuracy, TP and FP rates in the uncon-
trolled scenario. The reason for the performance degradation
is that more irregular and complicated body movements are
present when the user behaves casually with IoT devices,
which makes the feature extractor to extract more noisy
features about radio propagation patterns and thus hampers
the prediction ability of the on-off predictor. More specifically,
the system has a TP rate reduction of 3.0% and a FP rate
increase of 2.0% for uncontrolled motions. This is due to
the fact that, compared with off-body radio signals, on-body
signals, dominated by creeping waves, are more sensitive to
user motion dynamics, which results in more on-body RSS
segments to be mistakenly classified as off-body ones.
Performance in various environments. We next validate
the authentication performance of our system in various indoor
and outdoor environments in Fig. 12. Basically, indoor radio
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Fig. 13. Training losses of adversarial and non-adversarial models.
propagations remarkably differ from outdoor propagations in
terms of shadowing and multipath fading. We divide the
prediction results into different environment groups based on
the environment label and compute the evaluation metrics in
each group. As shown in Fig. 12 (a), our system achieves
almost the same accuracy in each environment. However, as
illustrated in Fig. 12 (b), the differences between the indoor
and outdoor environments can be reflected more clearly on
FP rates. Roughly speaking, lower FP rates are found in
the outdoor settings rather than in the indoor ones. This is
because that there generally exists less multi-path variations
in outdoor propagations, which consequentially leads to less
off-body segments to be mistakenly recognized as on-body
ones. However, according to Fig. 12 (b), the office setting
shows the lower FP rate than those of the other indoor
environments due to less disturbances caused by other people.
The above observations indicate that off-body segments tend
to be more susceptible to environmental dynamics. Moreover,
environment noise in RSS segments is an important factor
that influences the system’s performance. Generally, the lower
the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is, the less distinguishability
on- and off-body RSS segments have and the more difficult
it is for a classifier to discriminate. To deal with environment
noise, our system extracts representative time and frequency
domain features from noisy RSS segments and further uses
an environment discriminator to exclude environment specific
information. As shown in Fig. 12 (a), our system achieves
an accuracy of over 90% in each environment, which shows
the effectiveness of our system in the presence of real-world
environment noise.
Effectiveness of minimax game. We further illustrate the
benefits of adopting two adversaries in our multi-player model.
Our adversarial discriminator and classifier aim at helping the
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Fig. 14. Testing losses of predictors. The rise of curves is due to the over-
fitting phenomenon.
feature extractor to discover transferable features and boosting
the generalization ability of the on-off predictor. To illustrate
these merits, we set up a version of our model with a pair
of non-adversarial discriminator and classifier as a baseline.
Note that in the baseline model, the update of the extractor’
parameters relies solely on the minimization of the predictor’s
loss.
Fig. 13 (a) and (b) plot the training losses of discriminators
and classifiers in our and baseline models, respectively. In each
figure, the lower the value is, the more the information per-
taining to body motions or ambient environments is learned.
In Fig. 13 (a), we can see that the loss of the non-adversarial
discriminator declines quickly and then stabilizes at a very
low level. However, the loss of our adversarial discriminator
first fluctuates dramatically and then finally converges to a
high value. The same observations can be found in Fig. 13
(b). This is due to the fact that at the beginning of training
process, the fluctuations of an adversarial loss are incurred
by its minimax optimization, and they mitigate gradually
as motion or environment specific features irrelevant to the
predictor fade out in the extracted feature representation.
The above results reveal that the extractor in our model
abstracts more transferable features than that in the baseline.
Furthermore, comparing the performance of two predictors
in our and baseline models in Fig. 14, we find that both
loss curves decrease at first and then increase after certain
numbers of iterations. However, the adversarial curve rises
up at a slower speed than the non-adversarial one, which
suggests that the adversarial discriminator and classifier work
as two regularizers for alleviating over-fitting and enable the
promotion of the predictor’s generalization ability.
VIII. Conclusion
This paper proposes a new device authentication system
that takes one step forward to embrace the advent of human-
centric IoT by supporting various wearable devices anytime
and anywhere. The key enabling technique is using an ad-
versarial multi-player network to effectively recognize radio
propagation patterns under diverse user motions in different
environments. Moreover, integrating with upper-layer security
protocols, our system is able to in depth secure on-body IoT
device pairing and data transmission. We theoretically analyze
our adversarial model and prove that at equilibrium, our
model becomes invariant to motion variances and environment
changes. We build a working prototype of our system using
USRP devices and conduct extensive experiments with various
12
static and dynamic user motions in typical indoor and outdoor
settings. The experimental results show that our system can
successfully identify 90.6% of legitimate devices and mitigate
92.8% of active attack attempts.
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